November 23, 2021
Introduction
The key findings from the previous monitoring report in this series, did not indicate that Hungarian government propaganda was strong among the Hungarian community in Ukraine, at least in the minority media outlets and among the local political actors.
The local minority narratives, problematic and divisive from the Ukrainian perspective, especially those representing ethnic Hungarians as a mistreated minority in Ukraine as well as those addressing the ‘indigenous’ issue,[1] judging by the total interactions generated on Facebook, were stronger in the Hungarian minority media outlets than the Hungarian government narratives (i.e. ‘Hungary is a protector of traditional values’, ‘Hungary is a protector of the traditional family’, ‘Ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine should apply for Hungarian citizenship’).
However, the numbers of Facebook posts representing the studied narratives in the minority media outlets were very small in comparison with the total number of posts. Since there were no statistically confirmed biases in favor of any studied narrative judging by the numbers of posts, these media outlets were likely to be not politics-oriented at all.
The Facebook audiences of five out of the ten pages run by the minority media outlets, judging by the average interactions for the posts representing such narratives, turned out to be receptive to local conflict-oriented narratives that were alienating the Hungarian minority from Ukrainian society and state. Surprisingly, the Facebook audiences of two out of the ten pages run by the minority media outlets turned out to be also receptive to the narrative of Hungary as a protector of the traditional family.
This monitoring report closely follows the preliminary research assumptions and the methodology described in the previous Monitoring report for May and June 2021.
Three research questions were defined after consultations with partners, Slovak Security Policy Institute (Bratislava, Slovakia) and Expert Forum (Bucharest, Romania), mirroring analogous research in these countries: 1) How strong is Hungarian government propaganda among the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia (Ukraine) and what are the prevalent narratives? 2) How strong are the narratives of the Hungarians as mistreated minority and Hungarians as indigenous minority among the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia (Ukraine)? 3) How strong is the narrative of Ukraine as a failed state?
Read more: Hungarian Minority Political Landscape and Hungarian Minority Media in Transcarpathia.
Findings
The second part of the sample included 570 Facebook posts from 24 local Transcarpathian sources (both political actors and media outlets) and 157 Facebook posts from five Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets. The posts from Transcarpathian sources contained the pre-defined keywords developed for all eight narratives and the posts from five Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets contained the keywords developed for the local minority narratives only. Manual coding confirmed the presence of the studied narratives in 74 Facebook posts from local Transcarpathian sources and in seven Facebook posts from the Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets.
The numbers of posts representing local narratives in the minority media outlets were compared with the number of analogous posts in Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets. There were statistically significant differences (as confirmed first by chi-squared test and then by two sample z-test for comparing two proportions) in the proportions of posts that represented the narrative of the Hungarians as mistreated minority in Ukraine between three minority media outlets (KárpátHír, Kárpátalja hetilap, Kárpáti Igaz Szó) and four Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets (Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Nemzet, Hirado.hu, 888.hu; there were no such posts from Origo). The proportions of such posts from the former were greater that the proportions of such posts from the latter. Naturally, minority media outlets turned out to be more interested in the local minority narratives.
The numbers of posts that represented all studied narratives in the minority media outlets were also compared with the number of posts in pages run by local political actors. There were statistically significant differences in the proportions of posts that represented the narrative of Hungary as a protector of traditional values between Andrea Bocskor (Transcarpathian-born Hungarian MEP, Fidesz member) and two minority media outlets (KárpátHír and Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua). The proportion of such posts from Andrea Bocskor’s page was greater that the proportions of such posts from the two minority media outlets. There were also statistically significant differences in the proportions of posts that represented the narrative of Hungarians as mistreated minority in Ukraine between the pages run by four political actors (Andrea Bocskor, Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association (KMKSZ), László Brenzovics (KMKSZ leader), the political wing of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Ukraine (UMDSZ) – UMDP) and the seven pages run by minority media outlets (KárpátHír, Kárpátalja hetilap, TV21 Ungvár, KÁRPÁTALJA.ma, Kárpátinfo, Kárpáti Igaz Szó, and the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua). The proportions of such posts from the pages run by minority political actors were greater that the proportions from those minority media outlets. Unsurprisingly, there were also statistically significant differences in the proportions of posts that represented the narrative of Hungarians as indigenous minority in Ukraine between the pages run by five political actors (Andrea Bocskor, László Brenzovics, KMKSZ, UMDSZ, and the political wing of the UMDSZ – UMDP) and the five pages run by minority media outlets (KárpátHír, Kárpátalja hetilap, KÁRPÁTALJA.ma, Kárpáti Igaz Szó, and the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua); the only exception was the difference in the proportions of posts between Kárpátalja hetilap and KMKSZ that was not significant. The proportions of such posts from the pages run by the minority political actors were greater that the proportions of those minority media outlets. In general, the minority political actors turned out to be more interested in promoting the narratives of Hungarians as mistreated minority and indigenous minority in Ukraine.
The numbers of posts representing all studied narratives in the minority media outlets were also compared to each other. There were statistically significant differences in the proportions of posts that represented the narrative of Hungarians as mistreated minority in Ukraine between the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua and three other minority media outlets (KárpátHír, Kárpátalja hetilap, Kárpáti Igaz Szó). The proportion of such posts from the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua was less than those from KárpátHír, Kárpátalja hetilap, Kárpáti Igaz Szó. Such differences were not observed in the first part of the sample. However, the posting patterns of Karpat.in.ua changed radically in July-August 2021 compared to May-June 2021 – there was 362.82% increase in the total number of posts from the Hungarian-language version of the media outlet. This increase clearly impacted the proportions of posts representing the studied narratives.
Table 1. The numbers of posts representing the studied narratives by Facebook page (minority media outlets, minority political actors, Hungarian pro-government media outlets), July-August 2021.
The Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets turned out to support only two of the five narratives – that Hungarians are a mistreated minority and the narrative of Hungarians as indigenous minority in Ukraine (seven posts in total or six unique posts). Four posts contained primarily statements made by Péter Szijjártó, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Two posts (one unique post) were based on the interview with Andrea Bocskor – Hungarian MEP from Fidesz who was born in Transcarpathia. One post was based on the story in Magyar Nemzet written by Kárpáti Igaz Szó editor (from Uzhgorod, Ukraine) that conveyed the KMKSZ position on the Ukrainian state language law.
The posts from all minority sources representing the narrative of Hungarians as mistreated minority had the greatest number of total interactions. The posts representing the local narrative of Hungarians as an indigenous minority had the second largest sum of total interactions. Conversely, the posts representing the narratives of Hungary as protector of traditional values and the traditional family had smaller sums of total interactions. This order was the same for the sums of total interactions for posts from the minority media outlets only. In general, the Hungarian government narratives appeared to be less important for the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia than the local minority narratives.
There were at least three reasons why local narratives – ‘Hungarian identity in Ukraine is mistreated’ and ‘The Hungarian community in Transcarpathia should be recognized as indigenous minority’ – turned out to be relatively more important for the minority political actors and media outlets than other studied narratives. First, Ukrainian parliament adopted a law on indigenous minorities in July 2021 without the Hungarian minority being listed as indigenous — much to the outrage of the minority political leaders. Second, the minority political leaders often complained of alleged persecutions during meetings with foreign (non-Hungarian) diplomats. Third, Péter Szijjártó, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, made widely quoted statements supporting these narratives on various occasions, for instance, in the interview with Izvestia, the Russian newspaper.
Interestingly, the original interview was published at the beginning of July. Almost a month later Index.hu (Hungarian news website) translated and published excerpts from the interview with a biased background information on the language policy in Ukraine. This piece was republished by the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua, Kárpáti Igaz Szó, KÁRPÁTALJA.ma, and KárpátHír.
Unsurprisingly, the narrative ‘Ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine should apply for Hungarian citizenship’ was not detected in posts from the minority sources since it had been replaced by the competing local narrative calling for the recognition of the dual citizenship by Ukraine. The narrative ‘Hungary is a protector of traditional values’ was not very visible either. The minority media outlets published also several posts with the republished stories representing the narrative ‘Hungary is a protector of the traditional family’ taken from the Hungarian mainstream pro-government media outlets (e.g., Hirado.hu, ORIGO.hu, Magyar Nemzet).
There were several concentrations of posts that represented the narrative of mistreated Hungarian identity and the narrative of Hungarians as indigenous minority. The first concentration of the latter narrative at the beginning of July could be explained by the adoption of the law on indigenous minorities by Ukrainian parliament on July 1, 2021. All eleven posts (six unique posts) that were created on August 7, 2021 were based on the interview with Péter Szijjártó published in Izvestia. The minister, in particular, criticized the Ukrainian law on indigenous minorities. The last visible concentration of the posts characteristic of the narrative of mistreated Hungarian identity at the end of August 2021 occurred: 1) due to statements made by Szijjártó at the meeting with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov; 2) due to statements made by Szijjártó at the meeting with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Thus, the seemingly local narratives turned out to be supported by the Hungarian government official, perhaps, for foreign policy reasons.
Table 2. Average interactions for the posts representing the studied narratives by Facebook page (minority media outlets), July-August 2021.
The average interactions for the posts representing the studied narratives were compared with the average interactions for other posts (not representing the studied narratives) with an ANOVA test to measure the receptiveness of audiences to these narratives. The ANOVA test revealed significant differences between the average interactions generated by the posts representing the narrative of Hungarians as mistreated minority (in Ukraine) and the average interactions generated by the other posts (in favor of the former posts) in KárpátHír, KÁRPÁTALJA.ma, Kárpátinfo portál and the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua. There were also significant differences between the average interactions generated by the posts representing the narrative of Hungarians as indigenous minority (in Ukraine) and the average interactions generated by the other posts (in favor of the former posts) in KÁRPÁTALJA.ma and the Hungarian-language version of Karpat.in.ua. There were no statistically significant differences between average interactions with regard to other minority media outlets and narratives. In general, the local narratives resonated deeply with the Facebook audiences of four out of the seven minority media outlets that had posts representing them.
Other interim findings concerning media outlets were more intriguing. The only media outlets that supported the Hungarian government narratives were KárpátHír, run by the extreme Hungarian nationalists, and Karpat.in.ua (part of the KMKSZ media pool). In total, these narratives were supported by two out of the seven Hungarian-language minority media outlets. Kárpáti Igaz Szó (under the influence of UMDSZ), as it was expected, did not support these narratives. Once again, local narratives – the narrative of mistreated Hungarian identity and the narrative of Hungarians as indigenous minority – united media outlets of different political affiliations.
There was also no evidence that selected media outlets supported the border revision narrative. Meanwhile, the narrative of Ukraine as a failed state was detected in four posts from four minority media outlets, both in Hungarian and Ukrainian. Its presence could be at least partly explained by the use of pro-Russian Ukrainian news sources.
Summary
The findings of the content analysis done on the Facebook posts created in July and August 2021 did not indicate that the Hungarian government propaganda was strong among the Hungarian community in Ukraine, at least in the minority media outlets and among the local political actors.
The local minority narratives, problematic from Ukrainian perspective, e.g. the narratives of the Hungarians as indigenous people and mistreated minority (in Ukraine), judging by the sums of total interactions they generated, were stronger in the Hungarian minority media outlets than the Hungarian government narratives.
The numbers of posts containing all studied narratives from the minority media outlets were very tiny in comparison with the total number of posts. Unsurprisingly, the minority political actors turned out to be more interested in promoting the narratives of Hungarians as mistreated minority and indigenous minority in Ukraine than minority media outlets.
While most of these media outlets had strong political affiliations, there were almost no statistically confirmed biases in favor of any studied narrative between them judging by the numbers of posts. The only exception (anomalous bias) was caused by the radical increase in the total number of posts by one media outlet in July-August 2021 compared to May-June 2021.
The studied narratives were found in posts from eight out of the ten minority media outlets, i.e. in all seven Hungarian-language media outlets and one Ukrainian-language media outlet.
In general, the presence of the posts representing the Hungarian government narratives contradicted the expectations. They were found in posts from two out of the ten media outlets only. Media outlets of the KMKSZ media pool were expected to support them because of the close relationship between KMKSZ and Fidesz. However, they were found in posts from one media outlet of the KMKSZ media pool (one out of the six sources of the KMKSZ media pool). On the contrary, local minority narratives were found in posts from seven out of the ten minority media outlets, i.e. the media outlets of different political affiliations and all Hungarian-language media outlets.
The receptiveness of Facebook audiences to the studied narratives was determined by comparing the average interactions for the posts representing such narratives and the average interactions of the other posts. The Facebook audiences of four out of the ten minority media outlets turned out to be receptive to local conflict-oriented narratives (the narratives of Hungarians as mistreated minority and indigenous minority) that were alienating the Hungarian minority from the Ukrainian society and state. The posts representing other narratives did not generate sufficient numbers of interactions.
The final report will summarize the findings of the second and third reports. It will also present suggestions for further research.
Dmytro Borysov
This report has been prepared with support from IRI's Beacon Project. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of IRI.
[1] Ukrainian parliament adopted a law on indigenous minorities in July 2021 without the Hungarian minority being listed as indigenous - much to the outrage of the minority political leaders.